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This research develops a theory about the role of within-country income
inequality leading to overtaking in economic performance among countries.
The theory captures two opposing e⁄ects of inequality on factor accumulation
and suggests that the qualitative change in their combined e⁄ect is a prime
cause of overtaking. Due to the initial dominance of the positive e⁄ect of
inequality, a less egalitarian economy follows a higher growth path in the short
run, with a lower growth path in the long run. It is also shown that divergence
or convergence may arise instead of overtaking, depending on the initial levels
of development and inequality.
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In history, the evolution of global income distribution has been characterized by shifts in the ranking
of countries, as well as by divergence or convergence among them. As documented by Maddison
(2001, Table B-21), the Netherlands, whose per capita GDP had been the highest in Europe since
1600, was overtaken by the United Kingdom by 1870, and then economic leadership shifted to the
United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Outside the Western world, Japan and
the newly industrializing countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) overtook
Argentina and Chile during the second half of the twentieth century.1 Among the former European
colonies, a reversal in relative incomes has occurred over the last 500 years (Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson 2002).
Growth theorists have attempted to construct the theoretical foundations that account for
these unpredictable phenomena. Among others, Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993) argue that
overtaking re￿ ects a leading country￿ s failure to switch to a new technology that is initially less
productive than the existing technology. Goodfriend and McDermott (1998) develop a model
in which familiarity with a trading partner facilitates knowledge in￿ ows and enhances learning
productivity, human capital accumulation, and economic growth. Overtaking results from unilateral
familiarization of a less developed country with the leading country. Galor, Moav and Vollrath
(2005) suggest that while land abundance is bene￿cial for the process of development in the early
stages, land inequality hinders the implementation of educational reforms.2 On the empirical side,
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) document that the above-mentioned reversal among the
former European colonies resulted from the colonizers￿tendency to establish investment-promoting
institutions in relatively poor regions.
This research considers the role of income inequality within countries leading to one country
overtaking another in terms of economic performance. By focusing on two opposing e⁄ects of
inequality on factor accumulation, it examines the link between income distribution and the pattern
1In Maddison￿ s (1982, Table C.10) productivity ranking among 16 countries between 1870 and 1979, Abramovitz
(1986) ￿nds that Australia fell by 8 places, Italy by 2
1
2; Switzerland by 8, and the United Kingdom by 10, while the
United States rose by 4, Germany by 4
1
2, Norway by 5, Sweden by 7, and France by 8. See Jones (1997) and Pritchett
(1997) for empirical discussions on convergence and divergence.
2Among other related theories, Fischer and Serra (1996) demonstrate that a highly equal country tends to overtake
an unequal country in the presence of a human capital production function characterized by concavity and externality.
Mountford (1998) ￿nds overtaking by a country with a high saving rate in a dynamic version of the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin model.
2of development. The important premises here are that individual savings are convex with respect
to income, whereas returns on education are subject to diminishing marginal returns. In these
circumstances, inequality promotes the accumulation of aggregate physical capital by stimulating
the savings of the rich.3 On the other hand, inequality prevents the accumulation of aggregate
human capital by placing borrowing constraints on the poor with regard to education.4
The relationship between income distribution and economic growth has been one of the most
controversial topics in macroeconomics over the last decade. Despite the considerable number of
empirical investigations, little is known about the relationship between these two elements within
a single country. Most studies in the 1990s support the view that inequality is a hindrance to
growth, while some recent articles ￿nd that their relationship turns positive in the short run.5
Although these puzzling results would re￿ ect, to some extent, di⁄erences in estimation methods
and data qualities, it appears that this empirical ambiguity may re￿ ect opposing forces that operate
simultaneously.6
The proposed theory attributes the overtaking phenomena to a qualitative change in the com-
bined e⁄ect of inequality on factor accumulation. The positive e⁄ect on physical capital formation
is dominant at low levels of output. This is because, under low output and thus low wage rates,
the saving-rate di⁄erential between the rich (capitalists) and the poor (workers) is signi￿cant,
while investment in education provides few bene￿ts.7 However, the convexity of savings limits the
capital-enhancing e⁄ect to the underdeveloped stages, whereas the negative e⁄ect on human capital
accumulation increases with returns on education. This is why the overall e⁄ect of inequality on
output reverses at high output levels.
Note that this reversal is not enough to generate a development trap, as high wages, associated
3See Keynes (1936), Kaldor (1978), Stiglitz (1969) and Moav (2002) for theoretical considerations, and Mayer
(1966) and Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) for empirical evidence. The last paper supports bequest motives as in
Becker and Tomes (1986), in explaining higher saving rates for higher-income groups.
4Galor and Zeira (1993) present a seminal theory in this ￿eld. Flug, Spilimbergo and Wachtenheim (1998) draw
evidence from cross-country and panel regressions that credit market imperfections and unequal wealth distribution
have negative impacts on average secondary enrollment. Perotti (1996) empirically supports the view that income
equality encourages both male and female educational attainment.
5See Barro (2000) as well as Benabou￿ s (1996) careful overview of the empirical studies in the early 1990s. A
recent empirical work by Forbes (2000, p.885) concludes that "the relationship between inequality and growth is far
from resolved".
6For instance, Banerjee and Du￿ o (2003) argue that the di⁄erences in previous estimates can be explained by the
linearity of the estimated models. Atkinson and Brandolini (1999) ￿nd it inappropriate to simply use "high quality"
observations in Deininger and Squire￿ s (1996) data set on income inequality.
7An empirical study by Perotti (1996) ￿nds that income equality encourages investment in education more signif-
icantly in a group of high-income countries.
3with high output, permit educational investment by wage earners. What is additionally necessary
is highly unequal initial income distribution; this delays human capital accumulation signi￿cantly
and thereby generates the reversal in the early stages of development. In this case, the economy
converges to a steady state where wages are not su¢ cient for the poor to invest in education. A
very egalitarian economy, on the other hand, is driven by universal investment in education and
converges to a steady state characterized by higher output and persistent equality.8 Comparing
their output reveals that the former economy would follow a higher growth path in the short run,
with a lower growth path in the long run.
These results indicate that initial income distribution plays a signi￿cant role in determining both
long-run economic performance and the welfare of individuals.9 The underdeveloped steady state
acts as a development trap from which countries cannot escape without a substantial improvement
in equality brought about by exogenous forces. Contrary to the macroeconomic viewpoint, however,
it is shown that such a drastic redistribution is undesirable for the rich in both the long and short
run, as they acquire the largest steady-state wealth in the aforementioned trap. This implies
practical di¢ culties when actually pursuing a drastic redistribution.10
In addition to the two economies above, it is shown that an economy with moderate inequality
may catch up with an egalitarian economy after being overtaken. Moderate inequality mitigates
delays in the spread of education across individuals, and thus wages can reach a level that permits
educational investment by the poor. Then credit constraints become less binding among the poor
with the reduction in inequality, and the resulting universal investment in education leads the
economy to a higher-level steady state. As a result, the evolution of inequality displays an inverted
U-curve, as conjectured by Kuznets (1955).
The theory also reveals that convergence or divergence may occur instead of overtaking, de-
pending on the initial degrees of inequality and the respective development stage of the countries
concerned: Countries with similar degrees of inequality converge to similar growth paths, as long
as their initial resources are su¢ cient to ensure the subsequent capital accumulation. Countries
8Due to the convexity of individual savings, more egalitarian economies need more initial resources to ensure
capital accumulation. This paper does not go into the case of no (or negative) growth resulting from scarce resources.
9This is the notion emphasized by two seminal papers, Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993)
10While this is a meaningful implication, in this article, initial inequality is taken as exogenous and it is not
political factors but (endogenously determined) low wages that generate persistent inequality. Galor and Moav
(2000) alternatively propose a political economy view that capitalists would be willing to support the accumulation
of human capital by workers in order to sustain their pro￿t rates.
4with di⁄ering degrees of inequality tend to diverge from each other if they are already at an inter-
mediate stage of development. In this sense overtaking is perhaps less probable than divergence in
the current world economy, which is more developed than ever.11
The general tendency towards divergence is supported by some empirical evidence. Benabou
(1996) examines the role of inequality in the economic development of South Korea and the Philip-
pines, which were similar with respect to all major macroeconomic variables such as GDP per
capita, population, urbanization, and secondary school enrollment in the early 1960s. As a key
factor to interpret South Korea￿ s superior economic performance over the next 25 years, he points
out signi￿cant di⁄erences in their initial distributions of income and land ownership: Inequality was
much lower in South Korea as a result of its successful land reform following World War II. In fact,
the combination of equality and rapid growth was also achieved by other East Asian economies
(Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand) during 1965-89 (Birdsall,
Ross and Sabot 1995). Engerman and Sokolo⁄(2002) and Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2005) propose
the relevance of di⁄erent distributions of land ownership and human capital to the divergence in
income levels between North and Latin America in the second half of the twentieth century.
The analytical framework is based on Galor and Moav￿ s (2004) uni￿ed growth model that
features capital market imperfections, altruistic linkage, capital-skill complementarity, and the
above-mentioned contrasting properties of the saving and human capital functions.12 There are
three clear aspects that distinguish this research from theirs. First, Galor and Moav do not address
the issue of overtaking and divergence. Their approach is to divide the process of industrialization
into four stages, and examine the e⁄ect of inequality in one stage on subsequent growth within the
same stage (i.e., short-term growth). This paper, by contrast, studies longer-term growth beyond
the initial stage so as to observe diverse patterns of development.13 Second, their analysis executes
moderate redistributions of wealth so that the ex-ante state of the economy is maintained, whereas
this paper considers drastic redistributions that can shift the initial economic regime. Third and
￿nally, their research has positive as well as normative aspects. They trace a typical development
11The other central reason is that, as argued by Galor and Moav (2004), nowadays international capital markets
encourage the ￿ ow of capital across borders, making domestic savings less important for physical capital accumulation.
12When physical capital is complementary with human capital in production, returns on and the demand for skills
rise with capital intensity. See Goldin and Katz (1998) for empirical evidence.
13Galor and Weil (2002) and Galor and Moav (2004) theoretically analyze the long-run transition from stagnation
to sustained growth. Yet unlike this research, they do not discuss the role of income inequality.
5path of currently developed countries, showing that the role of inequality in economic growth has
changed over time.14 This article puts more emphasis on normative considerations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic structure of the
model, and Section 3 derives short-run equilibrium. Section 4 ￿nds the multiplicity of steady-
state equilibria, and then elucidates the global behavior of the dynamical system that governs the
evolution of inequality. Utilizing these results, Section 5 analyzes the impact of income distribution
on the behavior of output growth, by comparing the growth paths of hypothetical economies that
di⁄er only in their initial wealth distributions. Section 6 summarizes the discussion and proposes
future research. Proofs of technical results are placed in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a closed overlapping-generations economy operating over an in￿nite discrete time horizon,
starting with period 0. Individuals with perfect foresight invest in assets and education in the
presence of imperfect capital markets. In perfectly competitive environments, producers generate
a single ￿nal good that can be consumed or passed on to the next generation. Population and
technology are exogenously determined and stationary over time.
2.1 Producers
The amount of aggregate output produced at time t, Yt, is determined by the aggregate stocks of





t Ht ￿ f(kt)Ht; (1)
where ￿ 2 (0;1), kt ￿ Kt=Ht, and A > 0 stands for the level of technology. The market price of
the ￿nal good is normalized to 1.
In contrast to individuals￿loans taken out to cover the cost of education, producers freely rent
the services of capital and labor from households through competitive factor markets.15 Hence,
they maximize their pro￿ts given the market wage per unit of human capital, wt, and the rental
price per unit of physical capital, rt. This problem is to maximize f(kt)Ht ￿ wtHt ￿ rtKt with
14The development path proposed by Galor and Moav corresponds to the case of moderate inequality explained
above.
15This assumption is supported by the fact that compared to human capital, physical capital is easily collateralized.
6respect to Kt and Ht, and the associated ￿rst-order conditions are
rt = f0(kt) = ￿Ak￿￿1
t ￿ r(kt);
wt = f(kt) ￿ f0(kt)kt = (1 ￿ ￿)Ak￿
t ￿ w(kt):
(2)
Note that the rate of return on human capital, wt, increases with physical capital due to the
complementarity between the two types of capital. Physical capital depreciates at a constant rate
￿ 2 [0;1] in each period.
2.2 Households
2.2.1 Environment
A new generation of individuals is born in every period, living over the course of two periods.
Namely, there are two generations in society at any point in time. Individuals may be di⁄erent in
their initial wealth, yet they are homogeneous in terms of all other aspects. The population size of
each generation is normalized to one, and an individual born in period t is referred to as a member
i 2 [0;1] of generation t.
In the ￿rst period of life, when young, a member i of generation t engages in skill acquisition.
Human capital formation is augmented by physical investment, without which an individual will
obtain only basic skills. In this circumstance, the individual allocates transfers from her single
parent, bi
t; between education, ei
t, and savings, si




In the second period of life, when an adult, the individual acquires human capital hi
t+1 = h(ei
t),
where h(￿) is an increasing and strictly concave function de￿ned on R+; satisfying h(0) = 1 and the
Inada conditions.16 Wage income is earned by supplying human capital inelastically in competitive
labor markets. In addition, those who have savings rent out capital services to producers at the










where Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1 ￿ ￿ ￿ R(kt+1).
16Alternatively, h(0) can be viewed as the level of human capital acquired by public primary and secondary
education. In this case, inequality still generates di⁄erences in individual attainments in higher education.
7The preferences of a member i of generation t are de￿ned over ci
t+1, consumption in period t+1,
and bi
t+1, transfers to her single child.17 They are represented by the utility function
u(ci
t+1;bi
t+1) = (1 ￿ ￿)lnci
t+1 + ￿ ln(￿ ￿ + bi
t+1); (4)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿ ￿ > 0. The underlying premise of (4) is that intergenerational transfers are a







Each member of generation t maximizes her utility from (4) subject to (5). The optimal amount









t+1 ￿ ￿) if Ii
t+1 ￿ ￿;
(6)
where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1￿￿)=￿ > 0. The convexity of this transfer function asserts that inequality in wealth
Ii
t+1 across individuals enhances aggregate transfers.
Noting that the indirect utility strictly monotonically increases with Ii
t+1, this member chooses
educational expenditures so as to maximize Ii
t+1 in (3). Hence, the optimal level of education where
no credit constraints exist, denoted as et, is
et = argmax
e
[wt+1h(e) ￿ eRt+1]; (7)
where the factor prices are taken as given and predicted accurately. In light of (2) and the properties
of h(￿); the education level et is a unique maximum satisfying the ￿rst order condition
w(kt+1)h0(et) = R(kt+1) for kt+1 > 0: (8)
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that no physical resources are invested in education if the
economy is expected to be inactive in the next period; i.e., et = 0 if kt+1 = 0: It then follows that
there exists a continuous single-valued function
et = e(kt+1) for kt+1 ￿ 0; (9)
17One may suppose that c
i
t+1 includes the consumption of her child.
8where e(0) = 0 and e0(kt+1) > 0, implying that et > 0 as long as kt+1 > 0.18 The intuition of the
positive reaction of educational expenditures to a rise in the capital-labor ratio is straightforward:
due to the capital-skill complementarity, a rise in kt+1 enhances the return on human capital, wt+1,
while reducing the return on savings, Rt+1.
Note that et is the amount that any member of generation t is willing to invest if she can. In
this economy, however, imperfect capital markets completely limit individuals￿access to credit and
all of them cannot necessarily a⁄ord et. Bearing this in mind, the optimal level of education for a


























t ￿ et if bi
t ￿ et:
(11)
It follows from (6) that individual savings si
t are convex with respect to wealth Ii
t.19 Substituting










t ￿ et) if bi
t ￿ et:
(12)
This shows that members receiving more transfers will earn more income, due to the monotonicity
of returns on investment (in both physical and human capital).
2.3 The Initial Distribution of Wealth
In period 0, society is divided into two income groups, R (Rich) and P (Poor), which respectively
comprise ￿xed fractions ￿ 2 (0;1) and 1 ￿ ￿ of adults. There exists inequality in the initial wealth
Ii
0 between, but not within, these groups. Accordingly, members of each group behave identically
in every period, and those of each generation may be indexed by i = P;R: Let ki
0 be the initial
18Unlike Galor and Moav (2004), this paper assumes that h
0(e) ! 1 as e ! 0; and thereby omits their Regime
I, where et = 0 and kt+1 > 0. As will become apparent, however, this omission is not essential for one country to
overtake another in economic performance.
19This convexity holds within each household, but not for each individual, in the sense that s
i
t is the savings by a
member i of generation t; whereas I
i
t is the wealth owned by her parent. By contrast, Galor and Moav (2004) assume
that adult individuals accumulate savings, so that individuals￿savings are convex with respect to their own wealth.
Such di⁄erence is not essential for the main results below, and to simplify the exposition this paper does not follow
their assumption.
9capital owned by an adult member of group i. Her wealth is then Ii
0 = w0hi
0 + R0ki
0, where it is
assumed that hR
0 = h(e(k0)) > hP
0 = 1 and kR
0 > kP
0 = 0:20
The government may execute a redistribution policy in period 0. For the sake of simplicity, it
is assumed that redistribution is accomplished by using a lump sum transfer among adults, in such
a way that IR
0 ￿ " ￿ ~ IR
0 ￿ IP
0 + " ￿ ~ IP
0 :21 It then follows from (6) that initial transfers are
bi
0 = ￿ max(~ Ii
0 ￿ ￿;0): (13)
Hence, in light of (12),
IR
t ￿ IP
t ￿ 0 and bR
t ￿ bP
t ￿ 0; 8t ￿ 0: (14)
In other words, the initial ranking of wealth among dynasties never reverses in the future. This
results re￿ ect is generated by the unequal initial distribution of wealth, the monotonicity of returns
on investment, and the monotonicity of the transfer function.
3 Short-Run Equilibrium
This section considers the determination of economic variables in each period.
3.1 The Capital-Labor Ratio
In this closed economy, aggregate savings are the only source for aggregate physical capital in the
next period. Moreover, note that credit constraints are not binding for members of group R in
equilibrium (i.e. bR
t ￿ et); otherwise no aggregate savings lead to e(kt+1) = e(0), a contradiction
to the fact bR
t ￿ 0. It thus follows from (11) that
Kt+1 = ￿sR
t + (1 ￿ ￿)sP
t
= Bt ￿ ￿tet ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)bP
t ; (15)
where Bt ￿ ￿bR
t +(1￿￿)bP
t is aggregate transfers, and ￿t represents the fraction of young members
for whom credit constraints are not binding at time t: On the other hand, (10) yields the aggregate
20The assumption that h
R
0 = h(e(k0)) is made so that (31) below can be applied to period 0. However, this is not
essential for the qualitative results and one may alternatively assume that members of group R are initially unskilled.
21The level of " is determined at the beginning of period 0, so that all individuals take " as given.
10stock of human capital:
Ht+1 = ￿h(eR
t ) + (1 ￿ ￿)h(eP
t )
= ￿th(et) + (1 ￿ ￿t)h(bP
t ): (16)
Accordingly, in view of (9), the capital-labor ratio in period t + 1 is
kt+1 =
Bt ￿ ￿tet ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)bP
t




Given the properties of h(￿) and e(￿), this equation implies a continuous single-valued function
kt+1 = k(Bt;bP
t ;￿t); (18)
where k(0;0;￿t) = 0; limBt!1 k(￿) = 1; kB(￿) > 0; kb(￿;￿) < 0 for bP
t > 0; and kb(￿;1) = 0. Noting















Figure 1 illustrates the determination of ￿t on the (bR
t ;bP
t ) space, where bR
t ￿ bP
t ￿ 0: The
Credit Constraint Frontier, the CC locus, is de￿ned as the set of all pairs (bR
t ;bP
t ) for which22
bP
t = e(k(￿;1)) = e(k(￿;￿)):
The frontier approaches the origin as bR
t and thus kt+1 go to zero, and its slope is between zero
and one. Observe that e(k(￿;1)) < bP
t on the region above the frontier and e(k(￿;￿)) > bP
t on the
region below the frontier￿ both cases are consistent with the de￿nition of ￿t.23 Noting that the
e⁄ectiveness of credit constraints depends on between-group inequality, the (bR
t ;bP
t ) space in the
diagram can be divided into three regimes:24
Regime 1 (bR
t > et > bP
t = 0): This regime occurs on the vertical and the horizontal axes, where
inequality in transfers is high. Credit constraints are binding for members P of generation t;
who acquire only basic skills with no savings.
22These two equalities hold because q(￿;1) = q(￿;￿) if and only if b
P
t = e(kt+1): Without loss of generality, one can
choose ￿t = 1 if b
P
t = et; so that ￿t can be de￿ned in the above way.
23Likewise, e(k(￿;￿)) < b
P
t on the region above the frontier and e(k(￿;1)) > b
P
t on the region below the frontier.
However, both cases are inconsistent with the de￿nition of ￿t:
24Regimes 1-3 in the present paper are the counterparts of Stages I-III (of Regime II) de￿ned by Galor and Moav
(2004). Since, unlike their economy, this paper￿ s economy does not necessarily go through each stage in the process
of development, Stages I-III are renamed Regimes 1-3. The counterpart of their Regime I does not exist in this paper
as mentioned in Footnote 18.
11Regime 2 (bR
t > et > bP
t > 0): This regime occurs on the region between the bR
t axis and the
CC locus. While all members of generation t invest their endowments in education, credit
constraints are binding for group P:
Regime 3 (bR
t ￿ bP
t ￿ et): This regime occurs on the remaining region, where inequality is low.
All members of generation t attain the educational level et; and credit constraints are not
binding for any of them.






In order to simplify the following analysis of the dynamical system, complete capital depreciation,
￿ = 1, is assumed so that aggregate income (output) equals aggregate wealth in each period.25
Then, substituting (15) and (16) into (1), aggregate output in period t + 1 is expressed as
Yt+1 = ￿IR
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)IP
t+1 = Y (Bt;bP
t ;￿t); (21)
where Y (0;0;￿t) = 0 and YB(￿) = Rt+1, as (2) and (7) imply that et = argmaxYt+1: Thus due to
the properties of k(￿) in (18), the function Y (￿) is increasing and strictly concave in Bt; and the slope
YB(￿) diminishes toward zero as Bt goes to in￿nity. These results re￿ ect the neoclassical properties
of the production function with respect to physical capital. Also, Yb(￿;￿) > 0 for bP
t 2 (0;et) and
Yb(￿;1) = 0; implying that a rise in bP
t enhances human capital hP
t+1 and thus output Yt+1 as long
as credit constraints are binding for group P:
4 The Dynamical System
Equations (2) and (20) assert that the second period￿ s income Ii




t (i;j = R;P) through wage and interest rates (yet not through et because et = argmaxIi
t+1):






25Assuming ￿ 2 [0;1) would not contaminate any qualitative properties of the dynamical system.
12where I(0;0) = Ii(0;0) = 0, as no aggregate transfers lead to no physical capital and no output in




t > 0; @IP(￿)=@bR





> 0 if bP
t < et
< 0 if bP
t ￿ et:
(23)
The ￿rst two properties above, together with (21), yield that @Ii(￿)=@bR
t ! 0 as bR
t ! 1. This
Inada condition re￿ ects the non-increasing returns to scale in physical and human capital invest-
ment, in addition to the neoclassical properties of the production function. Regarding the cross
derivatives @Ii(￿)=@b
j
t; the di⁄erence in their signs is explained by the following three facts. First,
as implied by (39) in the Appendix, capital income is more important than wage income for group
R; while the opposite is true for group P: Second, a rise in bR
t raises the capital-labor ratio and
thus the return on e¢ cient labor. Third, if credit constraints are binding, a rise in bP
t will decrease
the capital-labor ratio and thus increase the interest rate, otherwise the e⁄ect reverses.
Substituting (22) into (6), a trajectory fbR
t ;bP
t g1




t;kt+1) =  i(bR
t ;bP
t ) for i = R;P; (24)
with the initial condition (bR
0 ;bP
0 ) in (13).
4.1 Steady-State Equilibria
This subsection characterizes steady-state equilibria of the dynamical system (24).
4.1.1 Egalitarian Case
First, consider an egalitarian steady-state equilibrium where bR
t+1 = bR
t = bP
t > 0 8t: This symmetry
implies that all individuals earn the same income and credit constraints are not binding in the
steady state. It then follows from (18) and (21) that IR
t = Yt and kb(￿;1) = Yb(￿;1) = 0: In these




t ;0;1)) = ￿[Y (bR
t ;0;1) ￿ ￿]: (25)
Due to the properties of Y (￿); this condition is satis￿ed by at most two positive values of bR
t . In
order to assure their existence, it is assumed that the technological level A is su¢ ciently high:
A > A ￿ A(￿;￿;￿ ￿); (A1)
13where A is the critical level which yields a unique solution in (25).
4.1.2 Inegalitarian Case
Next, consider an inegalitarian steady-state equilibrium where bR
t+1 = bR
t > bP
t = 0 8t: This
asymmetry and (19) imply that credit constraints are binding for group P in the steady state (i.e.
et > bP





In light of (17) and (39) in the Appendix, one ￿nds that the income I(bR
t ;k(￿bR
t ;0;￿)) strictly de-
creases with ￿ for a given bR
t > 0: This result, together with the properties of IR(￿) and Assumption
(A1), assures that at least two positive values of bR
t satisfy (26). The inegalitarian steady-state
equilibrium occurs if bR
t additionally satis￿es the condition IP(bR
t ;0) = wt+1 ￿ ￿:





t ;0;￿)); ￿ 2 (0;1]: (27)
Let ￿ b and b
ﬂ
denote the largest transfers in a locally stable and locally unstable steady-state equilib-




(￿) for all ￿; where ￿ b(￿) and
b
ﬂ
(￿) are single-valued functions.
Let ^ b be the critical level of transfers such that
w(^ k) = ￿; where ^ k ￿ k(￿^ b;0;￿); (28)
implying a single-valued function ^ b = ^ b(￿). It follows that if ￿ b(￿) ￿ ^ b(￿); the pair (bR
t ;bP
t ) = (￿ b(￿);0)
does not lead to a wage rate greater than ￿, generating the inegalitarian steady-state equilibrium.26
The existence of the steady-state equilibrium depends on the sign of the di⁄erence ^ b(￿) ￿￿ b(￿).
Lemma 1 Under (A1); the di⁄erence ￿ b(￿) ￿^ b(￿) is increasing in ￿ 2 (0;1]:
Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
26In this case, the pair (b
ﬂ
(￿);0) also generates one of the steady-state equilibria because b
ﬂ
(￿) < ￿ b(￿):
14In light of this result, the sign of ￿ b(￿) ￿ ^ b(￿) depends on the level of ￿ if there exists a value
￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that27
￿ b(￿￿) = ^ b(￿￿): (A2)
This condition assures that ￿ b(1) > ^ b(1) and ￿ b(￿) < ^ b(￿) for a su¢ ciently small ￿ (i.e. high
inequality). It excludes the case that the wage rate remains either above or below ￿ for any ￿; and
allows us to examine the role of initial inequality in determining the long-run wealth distribution.
The analysis below builds on Assumption (A2).
4.2 Global Dynamics
This subsection analyzes the long-run evolution of intergenerational transfers by utilizing a phase
diagram. In order to consider various degrees of initial inequality, suppose that the fraction of
group R; ￿; can be either ￿S 2 (0;1=2) or ￿L ￿ 1￿￿S in period 0. Group R is referred to as Group
S (Small) if ￿ = ￿S, and as Group L (Large) if ￿ = ￿L:
Basic properties of global dynamics are illustrated in Figure 2, where (bS
t ;bL
t ) 2 R2
+ since
either groups S or L can be wealthier than the other. The space is divided by the two Credit
Constraint Frontiers, the CCS and CCL loci, on which bS
t = et and bL
t = et respectively. Note that
bS
t > et (bS
t < et) on the region below (above) the CCS locus, whereas bL
t > et (bL
t < e) on the
region above (below) the CCL locus. Therefore, Regime 3 occurs on the space surrounded by the
two frontiers.




t > ^ b(￿) and bP







￿ < ￿ b￿ < ￿ bL < ￿ bS:




￿); in Regime 3.
Proof. See the Appendix. ￿
Recalling (28), the ￿rst result means that members of group P can accumulate transfers up to
a certain level as long as the wage rate is greater than ￿. The upper bound ￿ b￿ is generated by the
27In light of (2) and (28), Assumption (A2) holds if
[￿=(1 ￿ ￿)A]
1=￿ = k(￿￿ b(￿);0;￿);
for ￿ = ￿
￿: This condition is feasible because ￿ b(￿) and thus k(￿ b(￿);0;￿) increase with A:
15neoclassical properties of the aggregate production function. The second result is owing to the fact
that concentrating capital ownership in few hands will promote capital revenues, which are more
important than wage income for capitalists.
In the diagram, g￿ ￿ g(1) and gi ￿ g(￿i) for a function g(x). The BBi loci are de￿ned as the
set of all pairs (bS
t ;bL
t ) for which bi
t+1 = bi
t, and includes the interval [0;^ bj] on the b
j
t axis.28 The
system displays the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria, which occur at the intersections of the
BBS and BBL loci. In view of Lemma 1, it is assumed that the di⁄erence between ￿S and ￿L is so
large that ^ bS ￿ ￿ bS and ^ bL < ￿ bL: As discussed earlier, the ￿rst inequality generates an inegalitarian
steady-state equilibrium, and the pair (bS
t ;bL
t ) converges to one of the points (0;0); (￿ bS;0) and
(￿ b￿;￿ b￿), depending on the initial amount and distribution of aggregate transfers. Observe that no
steady-state equilibrium occurs at (0;￿ bL).
Now we are ready to examine how the allocation of resources between the two groups a⁄ects the
subsequent evolution of transfers within dynasties of each group. As will become apparent, initial
inequality may play a signi￿cant role in determining individual living standards in the long-run,
depending on the level of B0. The economic intuition behind this result will be explained in the
next section.
First consider the case of B0 2 (b
ﬂ
￿;￿S￿ bS) in the diagram.29 If the initial transfers are entirely in
the hands of group S (i.e.high inequality), Lemma 2 yields that bS
0 2 (b
ﬂ
S;￿ bS) and bL
0 = 0, meaning
Regime 1. Hence bS
t grows over time while bL
t remains zero, and the pair (bS
t ;bL
t ) converges to
the inegalitarian steady-state equilibrium (￿ bS;0) in the same regime. Since Lemma 2 implies that
members of group S(= R) obtain the highest steady-state income in the steady state, this initial
condition is ideal for group S in the long run as well as in the short run. On the other hand,
inequality is not persistent if instead group L holds the entire amount of the initial transfers (i.e.
lower inequality). In this situation Lemma 2 yields that bL
0 2 (b
ﬂ
L;￿ bS) and bS
0 = 0, meaning Regime
1 as in the ￿rst case. Due to the property ^ bL < ￿ bL < ￿ bS; however, there is a period when bL
t is
greater than the critical level ^ bL; and consequently the pair (bS
t ;bL
t ) converges to the egalitarian
28The BB





t ) in (23). They are plotted so as to be gradual, and this way of
plotting may rule out some steady states that otherwise would exist. As will become apparent, this simpli￿cation
does not a⁄ect the qualitative nature of the dynamical system.




S. In light of (36) and (A3) below, this case occurs if ￿
S is
su¢ ciently small and A is su¢ ciently high.
16steady-state equilibrium (￿ b￿;￿ b￿) in Regime 3.30 It should be noted that the economy does not even
go through Regime 1 if the initial inequality is even lower. For instance, the perfectly egalitarian
case bS
0 = bL
0 leads to bS
t = bL
t and ￿t = 1 in all subsequent periods. In this case, transfers within
each dynasty start out in the interval (b
ﬂ
￿;￿ b￿), and monotonically increase to the steady-state level
￿ b￿.




￿): Unlike in the ￿rst case, egalitarian
policies may result in a gradual diminishment of resources, as all adults spend a large fraction of
their income on consumption. Equality therefore yields a long-run outcome that is not desirable
for anyone. In contrast, higher inequality such as bS
0 > bL
0 = 0 promotes intergenerational transfers
within dynasties of group S. Since this allocation yields bS
0 2 (b
ﬂ
S;￿ bS) as in the ￿rst case, the
economy converges to the nontrivial steady-state equilibria (￿ bS;0) in Regime 1.31 Thus initial
inequality is more desirable than equality at least for the richer group in any period.
Third and ￿nally, the allocation of B0 does not a⁄ect the long-run outcome if B0 < ￿Sb
ﬂ
S or
B0 > ￿S￿ bS: Regardless of initial inequality, transfers within each dynasty decrease toward zero in
the former case, while converging toward (b
ﬂ
￿;￿ b￿) in the latter case.
It is worthwhile mentioning that the diagram illustrates the growth path presented by Galor





0 = 0. This is the case in which initial inequality is not extremely high, as the number of
richer members is relatively large.32 Under this circumstance, the initial state is Regime 1, where
bL
t increases over time and bS
t remains zero. Once bL
t exceeds ^ bL, the economy enters Regime 2 and
the level of bS
t begins to ascend. At this stage, members in group S invest all transfers in education,
thus ending up with no savings. The economy reaches Regime 3 when the pair (bS
t ;bL
t ) crosses the
CCL locus. Then credit constraints are no longer binding and transfers converge to the egalitarian
steady-state equilibrium bS
t = bL
t = ￿ b￿: Wealth inequality therefore improves in the long run, and
its evolution displays an inverted U-curve over the process of development.
30In fact, as asserted by Lemma 3 below, the steady-state aggregate transfers and output are maximized in this
egalitarian steady-state equilibrium.















L]; and to (￿ b
￿;￿ b






32The population size of group R; ￿; can be less than 1/2 in their scenario. Since, as shown in Footnote 27, the
critical value ￿ in (A2) depends on the structural parameters, it follows that ^ b(￿) < ￿ b(￿) 9￿ < 1=2 if the technological
level A is su¢ ciently large.
175 Output Growth
The preceding section showed that the dynamic transition of the economic regime depends on
initial inequality. This section considers the underlying evolution of output and thereby examines
the impact of income distribution on economic growth.
For the sake of simplicity, the analysis below focuses on the development path on which a chain
of intergenerational transfers does not break once it emerges. That is to say, bP
t+1 ￿ bP
t for all t;
implying that bP
t￿1 = 0 if bP
t = 0: It thus follows from (6) and (12) that
￿t￿1 = ￿ and IP
t = wt < ￿ if ￿t = ￿; (29)
where ￿t denotes the fraction of members leaving transfers in period t: Note that ￿t is either ￿ or
1, and that if ￿t = ￿; the economy has been in Regime 1 until period t. As this chapter focuses on
regime-changing redistribution, it is assumed that in period 0 no redistribution policy is executed
within Regime 1; namely, " = 0 and ~ IP
0 = w0 < ￿ if ￿0 = ￿:
5.1 The Evolution of Output
By noting (6), (21) and (29), aggregate transfers throughout the three regimes are expressed as
Bt = ￿ max[Yt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)!(Yt;￿t) ￿ ￿t￿;0]
￿ B(Yt;￿t); (30)
where !(Yt;￿t) ￿ w(￿(Yt;￿t)) and ￿(Yt;￿t) equals the capital-labor ratio kt satisfying
Yt = Ak￿
t [￿th(e(kt)) + 1 ￿ ￿t]: (31)
In view of the properties of h(￿) and e(￿);
￿Y (￿) > 0; ￿￿(￿) < 0; ￿(0;￿t) = 0; lim
Yt!1
￿(￿) = 1: (32)
It then follows that BY (￿) > 0 for Yt ￿ ￿ Yt; where ￿ Yt is de￿ned as the critical output level below
which there are no aggregate transfers; i.e. B(￿ Yt;￿t) = 0:33 This condition implies a single-valued
function ￿ Yt = ￿ Y (￿t) such that ￿ Y 0(￿t) > 0; lim￿t!0 ￿ Y (￿t) = 0; and ￿ Y (1) = ￿:34
33As follows from (2) and (31), Yt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)!(Yt;￿) = f(kt)[￿th(e(kt)) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿t)]; where kt = ￿(Yt;￿t): In light
of (32), this assures the monotonicity BY (￿) > 0 and the existence of ￿ Yt:
34It follows from (2), (31) and Footnote 33 that for Yt > 0;
Yt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)!(Yt;￿t) > ￿t[wt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)!￿(￿)];
where the term on the left-hand side goes to zero as Yt goes to zero. Hence, B￿(￿ Yt;￿t) < 0 and ￿ Y
0(￿t) > 0:
18Substituting (30) into (21), the evolution of output throughout the three regimes is given by
Yt+1 = Y (B(Yt;￿t);bP
t ;￿t) ￿ ￿(Yt;bP
t ;￿t;￿t); (33)
where
￿t = ￿ and ￿t = ￿ in Regime 1;
￿t = 1 and ￿t = ￿ in Regime 2;
￿t = 1 and ￿t = 1 in Regime 3.
As shown in Figure 2, the economic regime in period t is fully determined by bR
t and bP
t .
The analysis below compares and investigates the evolution of output in each regime.
5.1.1 Regimes 1 and 3
Noting that bP
t = 0 in Regime 1 and ￿b(￿) = 0 in Regime 3, the evolution of output in these regimes





= 0 for Yt ￿ ￿ Yt;
> 0 for Yt > ￿ Yt;
where ￿ Yt is constant in each regime. Moreover, for Yt > ￿ Yt,
￿Y (Yt;0;￿) = Rt+1BY (￿) > 0;
￿￿(Yt;0;￿) = Rt+1[wt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)!￿(￿) ￿ ￿] R 0;
￿￿(Yt;0;￿) = [wt+1h(et) ￿ Rt+1et] ￿ wt+1 > 0;
(34)
using (7). Noting (32) and that BY (￿) ￿ ￿, the ￿rst property shows that ￿Y (Yt;0;￿) ! 0 as
Yt ! 1: The last two properties combined together reveal the di⁄erence in growth paths between
the two regimes. Such di⁄erence represents the e⁄ect of drastic redistribution on economic growth.
The sign of ￿￿(￿) above goes to negative in￿nity as Yt decreases to ￿ Yt; while it turns positive
at Yt = ^ Yt ￿ ^ Y (￿t); where ^ Y (￿) is a single-valued function such that !(^ Y (￿);￿) = ￿:35 Namely,
the above-mentioned egalitarian policies have negative impacts on aggregate transfers and thus on
physical capital only at underdeveloped stages.36 This growth enhancing e⁄ect of inequality is due
to the convexity of the transfer function (6) with respect to income.
The property ￿￿(￿) > 0 above re￿ ects the concavity of h(￿). Namely, in the presence of credit
constraints, equality enhances aggregate human capital by raising the ratio of fully skilled workers.
35As shown in Footnote 34, B￿(￿ Yt;￿t) < 0: Since, in addition, k(B(￿ Yt;￿t);0;￿t) = 0; equation (34) yields that
￿￿(Yt;0;￿) ! ￿1 as Yt ! ￿ Yt + 0: One can also ￿nd that ￿ Yt < ^ Yt by noting that !￿(￿) < 0 in the footnote.
36One can con￿rm from (17) that an increase in Bt leads to an increase in Kt+1.
19Yet this positive e⁄ect of equality (i.e. the negative e⁄ect of inequality) is not dominant at immature
stages of development; it approaches zero as Yt decreases toward the zero-transfer level ￿ Yt:37 This
is explained by the fact that these stages are characterized by scarce physical capital, which leads
to low wage rates relative to interest rates (i.e. low returns on education relative to savings) due
to the capital-labor complementarity in production. That is to say, the scarcity of physical capital,
rather than income inequality with credit constraints, is the prime factor for low stocks of aggregate
human capital in this situation. On the other hand, the opposite is true at higher levels of wages
and output.
To summarize, while the positive e⁄ect of inequality outweighs the negative e⁄ect in initial
development stages, the relative intensity between these opposing forces reverses in higher stages






< 0 for Yt 2 (￿ Yt; ￿ Yt + ￿);
> 0 for Yt ￿ ^ Y ￿;
(35)
noting that ^ Y (￿) is increasing in ￿ 2 (0;1]: Note that ^ Y ￿ ￿ ^ Y (1) since by de￿nition gi ￿ g(￿i) and
g￿ ￿ g(1) for a function g(￿).
Using (21) and (30), let
Y
ﬂ
(￿) ￿ Y (￿b
ﬂ
(￿);0;￿); ￿ Y (￿) ￿ Y (￿￿ b(￿);0;￿); ￿ B(￿) ￿ B(￿ Y (￿);￿); (36)
where Y
ﬂ
(￿) < ￿ Y (￿). As in the previous section, it is assumed that ￿S is su¢ ciently small and
^ bS ￿ ￿ bS; whereas ￿L is su¢ ciently large and ^ bL < ￿ bL: Therefore, these functions yield aggregate
output and transfers in the egalitarian and inegalitarian steady-state equilibria. Note that this is
not the case for ￿ = ￿L; as a steady-state equilibrium does not occur at (bR
t ;bP
t ) = (0;b
ﬂ
L):38
Lemma 3 Under (A1)-(A2); ￿ Y S < ￿ Y L < ￿ Y ￿ and ￿ BS < ￿ BL < ￿ B￿.
Proof. Since ￿(^ Y (￿);￿) = ^ k; (21), (28) and (31) yield
^ Y (￿) = A^ k￿[￿h(e(^ k)) + 1 ￿ ￿]
= Y (￿^ b(￿);0;￿):
37More formally, e(kt+1) and hence ￿￿(Yt;0;￿) in (34) approaches zero as Yt decreases to ￿ Yt:
38One may interpret ￿ Y
L and ￿ B
L as the steady-state variables on the condition that the economy remains in Regime
1 (i.e. b
P
t = 0) in all periods.
20It follows from (36) and Lemma 1 that ￿ Y S ￿ ^ Y S; ^ Y L < ￿ Y L and ^ Y ￿ < ￿ Y ￿. Hence, one can ￿nd
that ￿ Y S < ￿ Y L noting that ^ Y (￿) is increasing in ￿ 2 (0;1]; and that ￿ Y L < ￿ Y ￿ by using (35). These
results lead to B(￿ Y S;￿S) < B(￿ Y L;￿L) < B(￿ Y ￿;1): ￿
This result and the analysis in Subsection 24 imply the proposition below.
Proposition 1 Under (A1)-(A2); egalitarian policies are undesirable from the viewpoint of the
rich in any period, even though they maximize the long-run aggregate output.
Figures 3-4 depict the evolution of output in Regimes 1 and 3 for di⁄erent values of ￿: Figure 3
depicts the case where group R is small (i.e. high inequality), corresponding to the lower right part
of Figure 2. Figure 4 depicts the case where group R is large (i.e. lower inequality), corresponding
to the upper left part of Figure 2. In the diagrams,
￿1i(Yt) ￿ ￿(Yt;0;￿i;￿i); ￿3(Yt) ￿ ￿(Yt;0;1;1);
where superscripts 1 and 3 respectively are used to denote functions for Regimes 1 and 3. Observe
that ￿3(Yt) is strictly concave and identical between both diagrams. While ￿1i(Yt) is also strictly
increasing in Yt; it becomes lower than ￿3(Yt) at some output level below ￿ Y ￿.39 Consistent with
(36), the diagrams show that Yt = ￿1i(Yt) for Yt = Y
ﬂ
i; ￿ Y i, and Yt = ￿3(Yt) for Yt = Y
ﬂ
￿; ￿ Y ￿:




￿ < ￿ Y S, so
that there exists an initial output Y0 2 (Y
ﬂ
￿; ￿ Y S) that permits output growth in both egalitarian and






￿ Y (￿) = [A(￿￿)￿]1=(1￿￿); (A3)
where the equality follows from the fact that lim￿!0 ￿(Yt;0;￿;￿) = A(￿￿Yt)￿:40
5.1.2 Regime 2
The evolution of output in Regime 2 is given by
Yt+1 = ￿(Yt;bP
t ;1;￿) ￿ ￿2(Yt;bP
t );
39For simplicity in each diagram there are only two values of Yt that satisfy Yt = ￿
1i(Yt), although, unlike ￿
3(Yt);
the concavity of ￿
1i(Yt) is not guaranteed.






t 2 (0;et) and bP
t ￿ B(Yt;1) = ￿(Yt ￿ ￿): It follows that there is no impact of income
inequality on aggregate transfers. Hence, for Yt and bP




t ) < ￿3(Yt): (37)
This result re￿ ects that binding credit constraints cause production ine¢ ciencies.
5.2 Inequality and the Patterns of Growth
This subsection investigates the impact of income distribution on the output behavior over the




0 < ￿ b￿ for i = P;R; (A4)




￿ ￿ ￿), noting (25) and (36). Figure 2 shows that given
(A4), the pair (bR
t ;bP
t ) evolves in either Regimes 2 or 3 in all periods, converging to the egalitarian
steady-state equilibrium (￿ b￿;￿ b￿) in Stage 3.
Proposition 2 Under (A2)-(A4); Yt increases monotonically in either Regimes 2 or 3 for all pe-
riods, converging to the steady-state level ￿ Y ￿ in Regime 3.
Proof. The results, except the monotonic growth, follow from (36) and the evolution of transfers
described above. Since (6), (21) and (A4) yield Y0 2 (Y
ﬂ
￿; ￿ Y ￿); the properties of ￿3(￿) and (37)
show that Yt 2 (Y
ﬂ
￿; ￿ Y ￿) 8t ￿ 0 and that Yt+1 > Yt if the economy is in Regime 3 in period t. If





This implies that Yt+1 > Yt, as Bt = ￿(Yt ￿ ￿) 8t ￿ 0. ￿




0 < ￿ b(￿) and bP
0 = 0; (A4￿ )
meaning that the initial state is Regime 1. Recall that the fraction of group R; ￿, determines the
sign of ^ b(￿) ￿ ￿ b(￿) and thus the existence of a nontrivial, locally stable, steady-state equilibrium
in Regime 1. For the case ￿ = ￿L in Figure 2, the economy goes through Regimes 1-3 sequentially
over time and converges to the steady-state equilibrium where bR
t = bP
t = ￿ b￿. Aggregate transfers
monotonically increase over the ￿rst two regimes. On the other hand, for the case ￿ = ￿S in the
diagram; bS
t (= bR
t ) grows over Regime 1 in all periods, converging to the steady-state level ￿ bS:
22Proposition 3 Under (A2); (A3) and (A40);
(a) If ￿ = ￿L; the economy goes through Regimes 1-3 sequentially. Yt increases monotonically
and converges to the steady-state level ￿ Y ￿:
(b) If ￿ = ￿S; the economy remains in Regime 1 for all periods. Yt increases monotonically and
converges to the steady-state level ￿ Y S:
Proof. The results, except the monotonic growth in Regime 3, follow from (21), (36) and the
evolution of transfers described above. Note that the output level is below ￿ Y (￿) during Regime 1,
and that Bt > 0 and thus Yt > 0 in all periods. It thus follows from the properties of ￿(￿); Lemma
3 and (37) that Yt 2 (Y
ﬂ
￿; ￿ Y ￿) after Regime 1, implying monotonic output growth in Regime 3. ￿
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of output described in Proposition 3(a): Starting out at Y0 2
(Y
ﬂ
L; ￿ Y L); output monotonically increases over Regime 1 toward the take-o⁄ level ^ Y L; which is
lower than the steady-state level ￿ Y L. Hence Yt eventually exceeds ^ Y L and then the economy enters
Regime 2. Since the above proof shows that Yt 2 (Y
ﬂ
￿; ￿ Y ￿) afterwards, ^ Y L lies between Y
ﬂ
￿ and ￿ Y ￿
in the diagram. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of output described in Proposition 3(b). Starting
out at Y0 2 (Y
ﬂ
S; ￿ Y S), output monotonically increases over Regime 1 toward ￿ Y S; which is lower
than ￿ Y ￿: Now that ￿ Y S < ^ Y S; wage rates do not exceed ￿ and the economy remains trapped in the
regime.
It is plausible to state that among the above three cases, Assumption (A4) yields the lowest
degree of inequality, whereas Assumption (A4￿ ) with ￿ = ￿S yields the highest. Hence, Proposi-
tions 2-3(a) reveal that highly or relatively egalitarian economies grow towards the steady-state
equilibrium where Yt = ￿ Y ￿ and (bR
t ;bP
t ) = (￿ b￿;￿ b￿); despite the possibility of initially experiencing
Regime 1.41 On the other hand, inegalitarian economies are unable to converge to this steady state
according to Proposition 3(b) and Lemma 3. Nevertheless, the theorem below shows that they grow
faster than the others in early stages of development.
Theorem 1 (Overtaking) Under (A2)-(A3); consider a group of countries that di⁄er only in
their initial income distributions. Less egalitarian countries may achieve faster output growth in
the short run, depending on the initial output. However, they tend to end up with lower growth
paths.
41Since the economy in Proposition 3(a) has a relatively large ￿ and " = 0; it would be plausible to say that it is
more egalitarian than the economy in Proposition 3(b).




￿ < ￿ Y S < ^ Y S noting that ￿ bS < ^ bS and (A3).
Thus given Y0 2 (Y
ﬂ
￿; ￿ Y S) and " = 0; it is found that Y
ﬂ
S < ￿1S(Y0) = Y (B0;0;￿S) < ￿ Y S; implying
(A4￿ ). On the other hand, given this level of Y0 and a su¢ ciently large ", (A4) is obtained (for any
￿) by noting Lemma 3. The theorem therefore follows from Propositions 2-3 and Figures 3-4. ￿
The theorem re￿ ects a reversal of the qualitative e⁄ects of inequality on factor accumulation
in the process of development. As explained earlier, inequality has two opposing e⁄ects on fac-
tor accumulation: it promotes aggregate savings and thus physical capital accumulation, while
constraining the spread of educational investment.42 While the capital-enhancing force is initially
dominant, it dissipates at high levels of wages (and thus output). Since, by contrast, the negative
e⁄ect of inequality increases with output, their combined e⁄ect is negative at ^ Y ￿(< ￿ Y ￿) as shown
in (35). This is why the potential steady-state output level in Regime 1, ￿ Y (￿); is lower than the
steady-state output level in Regime 3, ￿ Y ￿:
Note that the reversal of the combined e⁄ect of inequality does not assure that ￿ Y (￿) is the
actual steady-state output in Regime 1. It is the case if the initial conditions are characterized by
(A4￿ ) and ￿ = ￿S; such high inequality signi￿cantly delays the accumulation of aggregate human
capital and thereby generates the steady-state level ￿ Y S below the take-o⁄ level ^ Y S; as shown in
Figure 3. Highly inegalitarian economies therefore converge to the underdeveloped steady state in
Regime 1 while being overtaken by egalitarian economies converging to the developed steady state
in Regime 3.
This phenomenon￿ overtaking followed by divergence￿ is likely to occur among countries char-
acterized by a high marginal productivity of physical capital. In those countries a large value of
￿ (i.e. disparity in returns between capital and labor) intensi￿es the adverse e⁄ect of credit con-
straints by delaying the growth in wages relative to output. As a result, the steady-state level ￿ Y (￿)
tends to be lower than the take-o⁄ level ^ Y (￿).43 It should be noted that the share of labor income
is less important for egalitarian economies where many individuals obtain asset earnings as well as
wages.
In contrast to the above case, an economy satisfying (A4￿ ) and ￿ = ￿L may catch up with
the leaders after being overtaken. Such moderate inequality mitigates the adverse e⁄ect of credit
42The adverse e⁄ect of credit constraints is re￿ ected in the expanding di⁄erence between et and e
P
t (= 0) in the
growth process.
43This is con￿rmed by the fact that if ￿ is su¢ ciently large, ^ b(￿); but not ￿ b(￿); goes to in￿nity.
24constraints, and thus ￿ Y L becomes higher than ^ Y L as depicted by Figure 4. Hence, although the
initial state is Regime 1, output exceeds ^ Y L at some time and grows toward the highest steady-state
level ￿ Y ￿ in Regime 3.
Lastly, the developed theory implies that convergence and divergence (without overtaking) are
attributable in part to the initial income distributions of the countries concerned: Similarity in
this respect leads them to similar growth paths in the long run, whereas dissimilarity propels semi-
developed countries to diverge from each other. Such divergence is explained by the fact that
in intermediate development stages, su¢ ciently high wages diminish the saving-rate di⁄erential
between the rich and the poor, nullifying the capital-enhancing force of inequality.44
6 Concluding Remarks
This research has developed a theory about the role of income inequality leading to one country
overtaking another in terms of economic performance. The theory highlights two opposing e⁄ects of
inequality on factor accumulation. On the one hand, concentrating wealth in the hands of a small
group promotes physical capital accumulation, due to the convex behavior of household savings
with respect to income. On the other hand, such inequality, together with borrowing constraints,
acts as a barrier to widespread investment in human capital￿ a prerequisite for sustained growth.
The former e⁄ect works only in early development stages where wages are low, while the latter
increases with returns on education and becomes more signi￿cant under wider inequality. The
resultant qualitative change in their combined e⁄ect permits egalitarian countries to overtake highly
inegalitarian countries, which remain underdeveloped.
The essential assumptions for the overtaking phenomenon above are the convexity of the saving
function, the concavity of the human capital function, and borrowing constraints on individuals￿
education decisions. Since the convexity limits the saving-enhancing e⁄ect to underdeveloped stages
with low wages, semi-developed countries will diverge if their degrees of initial inequality are diverse.
By contrast, countries with su¢ cient initial resources converge to similar growth paths if they have
similar degrees of inequality. Hence, the initial levels of inequality as well as of output play a
signi￿cant role in determining a country￿ s growth pattern.
44Income divergence is not predicted by Galor and Moav (2004), as they deal with only marginal changes in initial
inequality.
25The established theory con￿rms the political di¢ culty of implementing a drastic redistribution
in reality, by showing that egalitarian policies are undesirable from the viewpoint of the rich even
though they maximize the long-run aggregate output. This paper does not go into how to reach a
compromise between them. This topic is left for future research.
Appendix




for kt+1 > 0:
In light of this result and (17), the implicit function theorem yields
kB(Bt;bP
t ;￿t) = [Ht+1 + ￿te0(kt+1)=(1 ￿ ￿)]￿1 > 0;
kb(Bt;bP
t ;￿t) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿t)[h0(bP
t )kt+1 + 1]kB(Bt;bP






t = (1 ￿ ￿)kB(Bt;bP
t ;￿t) + kb(Bt;bP
t ;￿t):



















(1 ￿ ￿)R(k)[h(e(k)) ￿ (bi
t ￿ e(k))=k] for bi
t ￿ e(k):
(38)
This, together with (17) and (19), yields that
Ik(bR
t ;kt+1) ￿ 0 and Ik(bP
t ;kt+1) ￿ 0 8kt+1 > 0; (39)
where equalities hold only if bR
t = bP
t : These properties establish (23), noting that ￿(bR
t ￿et) ￿ Kt+1
in (15). ￿
Proof of Lemma 1. When kt+1 = k(￿bR
t ;0;￿); where bP
t > 0 and ￿ 2 (0;1]; kt+1 is increasing in both
bR
t and ￿. Thus by noting (27), (38) and (39), one ￿nds that ￿0(￿) < 0; where ￿(￿) ￿ k(￿￿ b(￿);0;￿);
26if and only if ￿R(￿(￿)) is slightly greater than 1. Since (25) implies that ￿R(￿(￿)) < 1 if ￿ is
su¢ ciently close to 1; it is infeasible to have ￿0(￿) < 0 for any ￿ 2 (0;1]: On the other hand,
k(￿^ b(￿);0;￿) is constant for all ￿, and hence the result follows. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. (a) Consider the region for Regime 2 in Figure 2. Due to the properties of
Ii(bR
t ;bP
t ), the BBS and BBL loci starting at (^ bS;0) and (0;^ bL), respectively, are non-positively
sloped. Hence, the result follows from Lemma 4 below, noting that the isoquants of the capital-labor
ratio are non-negatively sloped.
(b) As follows from (17) and (39), I(bR
t ;k(￿bR
t ;0;￿)) strictly increases with ￿. In addition, the
proof of Lemma 1 above implies that ￿ b(￿) is continuous in ￿ 2 (0;1]: Hence (27) and the de￿nition
of ￿ b yield the result.
(c) Let B > 0 be the aggregate (or equivalently, average) transfer in a steady-state equilibrium
in Regime 3. Then the associated capital-labor ratio is k ￿ k(B;0;1): Noting that ￿b(bi
t;k) =
￿R(k) for bi
t ￿ e(k); one can ￿nd a pair (bR;bP) such that bi = B = ￿(bi;k_ ) > 0: In this case B
equals ￿ b￿ or b
ﬂ
￿, as (25) and (A1) show that there are only two nontrivial egalitarian steady-state
equilibria. Noting the fact ￿YB(B;0;1) = ￿R(k) 6= 1 reveals that there is no other nontrivial steady




t ￿ ￿ b￿ and kt+1 > ^ k:
Proof. Recall that ’(0;^ k) = w(^ k)￿￿ = 0 and let ~ k be the value such that ￿R(~ k) = 1: It then follows
from (38) that for a given k > max(^ k;~ k), there exists a unique value of bP
t for which ￿(bP
t ;k) = bP
t
and below which ￿(bP
t ;k) > bP
t : Also, if k 2 (^ k;~ k) then ￿(bP
t ;k) > bP
t 8bP
t ￿ 0: Now note that (25)
and (38) yield ￿b(￿ b￿;￿ k￿) = ￿R(￿ k￿) < 1 and ￿k(￿ b￿;￿ k￿) = 0; where ￿ k￿ = [￿ b￿ ￿ e(￿ k￿)]=h(e(￿ k￿)): This
result, together with (38), assures the existence of a continuous single-valued function bP
t = ￿(k)
for k > ~ k; such that ￿(bP
t ;k) = bP
t ￿ ￿ b￿. The lemma therefore follows. ￿
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30Notes of Figures
Figure 1. The Credit-Constraint Frontier (The CC Locus). On the frontier, bP
t = et,
meaning unbinding credit constraints on and no savings made by group P.
Figure 2. The Evolution of Transfers. The regions below and above the 45￿ line, respectively,
depict the evolution of the transfers for ￿ = ￿S and ￿ = ￿L: The pair (bS
t ;bL
t ) converges to one
of the points (0;0); (￿ bS;0) or (￿ b￿;￿ b￿), depending on the initial amount and allocation of aggregate
transfers.
Figure 3. The Evolution of Output for ￿ = ￿S. There exists a locally stable steady-state
equilibrium in both Regimes 1 and 3. In the early stages of development, an inegalitarian economy
operates in Regime 1 and produces higher output than a more egalitarian economy in Regime 3.
However, the former￿ s output is unable to reach the take-o⁄ level ^ Y S, thus converging to the lower
steady-state level ￿ Y S in Regime 1.
Figure 4. The Evolution of Output for ￿ = ￿L: Unlike ￿ Y S in Figure 3, ￿ Y L is not a steady-
state level of output. Hence, output of an inegalitarian economy exceeds the take-o⁄ level ^ Y L (i.e.
departure from Regime 1), converging to the steady-state level ￿ Y ￿ in Regime 3.
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